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Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine the relation between audit committee (AC) and a set of other
corporate governance mechanisms in one of the emerging economies, United Arab of Emirates (UAE). In
particular, the current study examines whether an effective AC can serve as a substitute or as a complement
mechanism to board characteristics and ownership structure of Emirati listed non-ﬁnancial companies.
Design/methodology/approach – Using substitution and complementary theories, a panel data from 48
nonﬁnancial companies listed on the UAE Stock Exchanges [Abu Dhabi Stock Exchange and Dubai Financial
Market] during the period between 2011 and 2013 were used in the current study. A composite measure of
four proxies has been used to measure the AC effectiveness, namely, AC size, independence, ﬁnancial
expertise and diligence. To test the hypotheses formulated for the study, a logistic regression model was used
to identify the inﬂuence of a set of board characteristics and ownership structure variables on the
effectiveness of the AC after controlling for ﬁrm size, auditor type, industry type and proﬁtability.
Findings – While AC effectiveness appeared to be positively associated with board size and board
independence, it is negatively associated with CEO duality. This points to a complementary governance
relation. On the other hand, the negative relationship between AC effectiveness and each of institutional and
government ownership suggests substitutive relations.
Research limitations/implications – The main shortcoming of the current study is that it examines
the inﬂuence of a certain set of corporate governance factors on the effectiveness of AC. Other corporate
governance mechanismsmay, however, contribute to the effectiveness of AC. The ﬁndings of the study can be
used by companies’managements and regulators in the UAE to improve the corporate governance system.
Originality/value – To the best of researchers’ knowledge, this study provides the ﬁrst evidence about the
interaction among multiple governance mechanisms required by the code of corporate governance issued by
the UAE Ministry of Economy in 2009. The current paper is expected to add to the limited AC literature in
Middle East and North African countries in general andArabWorld in particular.
Keywords Ownership structure, Emerging markets, UAE, Corporate governance, Audit committee
Paper type Research paper
Introduction
Corporate governance consists of internal and external systems, rules and practices by
which a company is directed and controlled to ensure that stakeholder interests are
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balanced. Corporate governance became a pressing issue following the serious corporate
scandals that occurred in different countries all over the world. To react to such scandals,
sets of corporate governance regulations and codes have been established in different
developed and emerging countries to improve corporate governance practices. The Middle
East and North Africa region countries, including the United Arab Emirates (UAE), of
course, were no exception. Consequently, recent years witnessed signiﬁcant efforts exerted
by the UAE to promote the adoption of best corporate governance practices. Good progress
has been achieved in improving the quality of corporate governance for listed companies on
the UAE Stock Exchanges by adopting “Governance Rules and Corporate Discipline
Standards” in 2009 effective 30 April 2010. By improving corporate governance, the country
expects to bring wide-ranging beneﬁts to the economy from improving its corporate
governance such as enhancing international competitiveness, attracting local and foreign
investment and buildingmodern ﬁnancial and capital markets (OECD, 2005).
Any sound governance system is concerned with the interaction between the company
and its stakeholders, namely, shareholders, lenders, employees, local community,
environmental activists, customers and suppliers, as well as with its compliance with
legislation and regulations. However, the interactions of these different parties may result in
many conﬂicts. We believe that exploring how various corporate governance mechanisms
combine and interact is of great importance to identify the optimal and the most efﬁcient
corporate governance system for a given economy. The interaction between different
corporate governance mechanisms is one of the most important insights in recent corporate
governance research (Aguilera and Crespi-Cladera, 2012). Prior research has documented
that monitoring mechanisms work together as either complements or substitutes. The
complementary hypothesis offers an explanation to the synergistic effects among various
corporate governance mechanisms. According to this hypothesis, different elements of
corporate governance structures are interrelated (Aoki, 2002) which means that the adoption
of one mechanism increases the effectiveness of others and vice versa (Cassiman and
Veugelers, 2006). In this respect, researchers such as Cremers and Nair (2005) and Acharya
et al. (2011) argued that effective external governance mechanisms reinforce the
effectiveness of internal governance mechanisms. The alternative argument, however,
states that alternative corporate governance devices operate as substitutes for one another
(Fernández and Arrondo, 2005). In this regard, Giroud andMueller (2011) found that internal
and external corporate governance mechanisms can be substituted, while Gillan et al. (2006)
provided evidence that one internal corporate governance mechanism (board structure) acts
as a substitute for another (charter amendments).
The audit committee (AC) is a key internal governance mechanism required by the UAE
corporate governance code. The current study investigates whether the presence of an
effective AC is a substitute or complement for other corporate governance reforms, namely,
board characteristics and ownership structure in the Emirati listed non-ﬁnancial companies.
The board of directors, AC and blockholders are the primary monitoring mechanisms in the
UAE. The importance of these variables in the UAE context will be highlighted in the next
section that reviews the institutional background of the corporate governance code in the
UAE.
This paper sets out to achieve two objectives. The ﬁrst objective is to investigate the
relationship between AC effectiveness and other corporate governance mechanisms (board
characteristics and ownership structure) among non-ﬁnancial companies listed on UAE
Stock Exchanges during the period 2011-2013. The second objective is to test the validity of
two competing theories (substitution and complementarity). Therefore, the fundamental
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research question addressed in the current study is whether the ﬁrm’s AC in the UAE acts
as a substitute or complements other corporate governance mechanisms.
We believe the interaction between different corporate governance mechanisms in the
Emirati context and understanding the relationships among such mechanisms are
extremely important to enhance the efﬁciency of the UAE Stock Exchanges. A number of
reasons motivate the choice of the UAE as the setting for this study. First, as the country’s
establishment in 1971, the UAE economy has experienced remarkable growth to become one
of the Middle East’s most important trading areas. According to the UAE State of Green
Economy Report 2014, the nominal gross domestic product of the UAE has grown 27 times
since 1975, and the economy has become the second largest in the Arab world (after Saudi
Arabia) in 2014[2]. Due to this rapid transformation in the economy, the UAE has become a
key focus for international corporations as well as personal and institutional investors
(Obay, 2009). Second, the study examines the interaction among multiple governance
mechanisms required by the code of corporate governance issued by the UAE Ministry of
Economy in 2009. Third, in 2013, the UAE capital market was upgraded from “frontier” to
“emerging” market status by the Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) Emerging
Markets Index. This upgrade reﬂects international and institutional investors’ realization of
how far the UAE economy and capital market have developed in recent years. To enhance
conﬁdence in this upgrade, adopting sound corporate governance practices helps in
attracting more international and institutional investors, and thus, companies can raise
capital efﬁciently and effectively, given that the UAE market is still characterized by a
signiﬁcant degree of ownership concentration (Obay, 2009; Hussainey andAljifri, 2012).
This paper contributes to a very limited empirical literature on the interaction between
different corporate governance mechanisms in emerging economies, generally, and the
Middle East countries, particularly. According to Al-Baidhani (2014), the institutional
setting in emerging economies requires a different bundle of corporate governance
mechanisms than developed countries as corporate governance conﬂicts in emerging
economies are mainly principal-principal rather than principal-agent. According to DeFond
and Francis (2005), while it is important to understand the manner in which competing
governance mechanisms interact, there is a lack of research on such interaction.
Furthermore, the current study measures AC effectiveness using a composite index
comprising four AC characteristics (AC size, independence, ﬁnancial expertise and
diligence). Most of the limited literature that has investigated AC effectiveness has used only
one dimension to measure AC effectiveness (Raghunandan and Rama, 2007; Greco, 2011; Al-
Najjar, 2011). Thus, it seems that there is a signiﬁcant knowledge gap regarding the
interaction between various corporate governance reforms, especially the relationship
between AC effectiveness and other governance mechanisms. Conducting such research will
help ﬁll that gap in the existing literature.
In addition to contribution to the scarce literature on the interaction between various
corporate governance mechanisms in emerging economies, several parties would beneﬁt
from the ﬁndings of this study. UAE authorities could use the ﬁndings to assess the
relationship between a key corporate governance mechanism (AC) and other corporate
governance practices (board of directors and ownership structure) several years after
adopting the code. By understanding the association between different governance
mechanisms, UAE regulators and policy makers can assess key governance strengths and
weaknesses that would help them to improve and adopt an optimal governance system
constituted from interacting governance mechanisms. Policymakers and regulators in other
Middle Eastern countries, especially Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, would beneﬁt
from the outcome of the study, as they share a similar social, political and economic
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environment with the UAE. Finally, the study ﬁndings address foreign investors’ concerns
related to governance issues they usually take into account when making investment
decisions. It is believed that foreign companies may be encouraged to practice their business
in the UAE not only for being the main gateway to enter the Middle East market or for its
modern infrastructure but also for the conﬁdence in the stability of the country’s economy
and stock markets. Therefore, this study highlights the important role that sound corporate
governance plays in ﬁnancial stability by underpinning ﬁnancial market integrity and
economic efﬁciency and, thus, can enhance local and foreign investors’ conﬁdence.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. A brief overview of corporate governance in
the UAE is presented in the following section. A literature review covering variables that are
expected to interact with the AC in the UAE context together with hypotheses development
are provided in Section 3. The study methodology is presented in Section 4, and the study
ﬁndings are summarized in the Section 5. The conclusion is offered in the last section.
Corporate governance in the UAE
In 2007, the Securities and Commodities Authority (SCA) issued the Corporate Government
Code expanding government rules and requirements that should be followed by companies
listed on the UAE stock markets (Abu Dhabi and Dubai). The code is mainly derived from
international standards. Two years later (2009), the Ministry of Economy issued Ministerial
Resolution No. 518 amending SCA’s code and providing more comprehensive corporate
governance rules (the Corporate Governance Code) and discipline standards. The resolution
asked all companies authorized by the SCA to operate in the UAE and listed on UAE stock
markets to comply with the Corporate Governance Code with effect from 30 April 2010.
However, the 2009 governance code does not apply to government owned institutions;
Central Bank regulated entities or foreign companies. The code sets out principles and
standards of good practice related to issues such as the board of directors (its
responsibilities, composition, committees and directors’ remuneration), internal control
systems, risk management, shareholders’ rights and the appointment and discharging of the
external auditors.
The board-related provisions include:
 at least one-third of board members must be independent directors and the majority
must be non-executive directors;
 the positions of chairperson and the company manager and/or managing director
should not be occupied by same person; and
 the board of directors shall meet at least once every two months.
However, one of the problems faced by the UAE code of governance during the transition
period is related to the effectiveness of the board of directors (Baydoun et al., 2013; Hassan,
2015). Baydoun et al. (2013) argued that in the UAE, similar to other GCC countries, it is
difﬁcult to ﬁnd genuinely independent non-executive directors who contribute signiﬁcantly
to corporate governance due to the small population of potential directors. Although Hassan
(2015) conﬁrmed this argument, he noted that independent and non-executive directors
could act as change agents encouraging and supporting the adoption of new ideas obtained
from knowledge possessed from working in other companies promoting new ideas such as
the enhancing the role of the AC (Hassan, 2015).
The UAE code also stipulates that the board of directors must form an AC consisting of
at least three non-executive board members, a majority of the members must be independent
directors and at least one member must be a ﬁnancial and an accounting expert. The
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committee shall meet at least once on a quarterly basis or whenever necessary. Shehata
(2015), who discussed and compared corporate governance codes in GCC countries, argued
that the AC in the UAE, like all other GCC countries, is considered a cornerstone in corporate
governance (Shehata, 2015). Shehata (2015) found ACs in these countries’ codes, including
the UAE, carry out the following responsibilities:
 overseeing the integrity of the ﬁnancial statements;
 monitoring the effectiveness of the internal audit function; and
 recommending to the board the appointment of the external auditor.
The ownership structure is another concern encountered by the Emirati governance code
during the transition period. Ownership structure is one of the key corporate governance
mechanisms and is widely considered to interact with other corporate governance
characteristics (La Porta et al., 1998). Unlike corporations in the developed countries,
characterized by widely dispersed ownership, the UAE corporations are dominated by
highly concentrated ownership and controlled by a few controlling shareholders (Obay,
2009; Hussainey and Aljifri, 2012; Baydoun et al., 2013; Hassan, 2015). Thus, the main
problem in the UAE lies in the conﬂict between major shareholders and weak minority
shareholders (Su et al., 2008; Lins, 2003). According to Hassan (2015), this distinctive
institutional feature appears to undermine non-executive directors’ independent monitoring
and supervisory functions.
The external auditor, according the UAE governance code, shall be nominated by the
board of directors based on a recommendation presented by the AC. However, the general
assembly of the company must approve the appointment and remuneration of the external
auditor. While engaged in auditing a company’s accounts, external auditors are not allowed
to provide technical, administrative or consultation services that may conﬂict with their
independence.
Previous related studies and hypotheses development
Dependent variable
Over the past few decades, considerable attention has been paid to the role of the AC as a
mechanism that enhances ﬁnancial reporting. Early research has investigated factors that
might affect the formation of an AC and the inﬂuence of an AC on the quality of ﬁnancial
reporting. However, this stream of research was criticized by some researchers (such as
Turley and Zaman, 2004; Firth et al., 2007) who argued that the mere establishment of an AC
does not necessarily indicate it functions effectively. Therefore, the past decade witnessed
increasing research efforts to investigate factors affecting the quality and effectiveness, not
merely the formation, of the AC. The AC’s effectiveness has been measured using various
AC characteristics such as AC size (Krishnan, 2005), AC independence (Krishnan, 2005;
Zhang et al., 2007), ﬁnancial expertise of the committee members (Krishnan, 2005; Zhang et
al., 2007) and AC diligence (Abdel-Meguid et al., 2014).
An AC with sufﬁcient members is expected to strengthen the effectiveness of the AC in
executing its oversight and monitoring function. A large AC provides a greater monitoring
function, as it has more members to undertake various monitoring tasks (Anderson and
Reeb, 2003). Moreover, an AC with an appropriate number of members enables members to
employ their experience and expertise for the beneﬁt of the stakeholders (Pearce and Zahra,
1992) as well as to identify and address potential problems in the ﬁnancial reporting (Felo
et al., 2003; Bedard et al., 2004). In this regard, Kyereboah-Coleman (2007) argued that an AC
should consist of at least three members.
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A key feature of an effective AC is its independence from management. Extant literature
provides empirical support that an AC with independent directors provides substantial
beneﬁts to the corporation and its stakeholders. Lam (2000) and Raghunandan and Rama
(2007) argued that AC independence enhances auditor independence and improves
transparency in ﬁnancial reporting. Other researchers found that AC independence is
associated with a lower level of earningsmanagement practices (Saleh et al., 2007).
The ﬁnancial expertise of the AC is another key dimension of AC effectiveness.
According to Raghunandan et al. (2001), ACs with ﬁnancial expertise have greater
interaction with the internal auditors. Moreover, AC members with ﬁnancial expertise are
more likely to support external auditors in conﬂict situations with management (Dezoort
and Salterio, 2001) and are less likely to experience internal control problems (Krishnan,
2005). Therefore, contemporary regulations and best practices either require or recommend
AC members to possess a certain level of ﬁnancial competencies. Some authors documented
that ﬁnancial expertise of AC members plays a signiﬁcant role in constraining earnings
management (Saleh et al., 2007; Nelson and Devi, 2013), whereas companies that have ACs
with less ﬁnancial expertise are more likely to be identiﬁed with an internal control
weakness (Zhang et al., 2007).
AC diligence, measured by the number of AC meetings, is also used by previous
literature to measure AC effectiveness (Kyereboah-Coleman, 2007; Mohid Rahmat et al.,
2009). ACs need to meet regularly to ensure that the ﬁnancial reporting process is
functioning properly. In this respect, McMullen and Raghunandan (1996) suggested that AC
that meets more frequently is expected to be better in examining the accounting and internal
control system as well as in informing top management concerning the committee’s actions.
Abbott et al. (2004) suggested that an AC that meets at least four times a year is negatively
associated with the occurrence of earningsmanagement.
Drawing from the work of DeZoort and Salterio (2001) and Klein (2002), the current study
argues that an AC with greater size, independence, ﬁnancial expertise and diligence will be
more effective in its role. In this study, these four features of the AC are combined together in
one index andwill be used as a dependent variable to measure AC effectiveness.
Independent variables
Many empirical studies have shown some corporate governance features inﬂuence the
effectiveness of ACs. This study uses some of these governance mechanisms as independent
variables. These variables and the rationale behind including them in the study are
discussed below.
Board characteristics. The board of directors is typically central to corporate governance,
as its relationship with shareholders and management and other primary participants is
critical. It is argued that the board of directors is the most important mechanism used in
minimizing agency cost arising from the separation between ownership and management
(Fama and Jensen, 1983; Belkhir, 2009). The effectiveness of the board in its monitoring
function depends on certain characteristics. These characteristics include, among others, its
size, independence and CEO duality.
Two main arguments were advanced in literature to explain the role of the board size in
enhancing monitoring management. First, proponents of large boards argued that larger
boards are more effective in their monitoring function than small ones. Large boards are
able to commit more time and efforts to monitor management than smaller ones (Monks and
Minow, 2004) and can distribute the workload over a greater number of directors (Klein,
2002). Moreover, large boards reduce management dominance (Hussainey and Wang, 2010)
and provide better collective experience and expertise (Akhtaruddin et al., 2009). Some
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studies documented a positive relationship between the board size and the existence or
effectiveness of the ACs (Bradbury, 1990; Piot, 2004; Firth et al., 2007). In a recent study,
Abdel-Meguid et al. (2014) found a positive relationship between the board size and the
effectiveness of ACs in Egypt. Another recent study by Hassan and Hijazi (2015) found a
positive (although insigniﬁcant) relationship between board size and the existence of an AC
in Palestine. On the other hand, proponents of small boards suggested that large boards are
more likely to face communication and coordination problems between members (Jensen,
1993; Cheng, 2008) and thus would slow the decision-making process (Yermack, 1996).
Therefore, as smaller boards have the advantage of less coordination costs, they are able to
monitor the ﬁrm without establishing ACs or delegating part of their responsibilities to ACs
(Bushman et al., 2004; Piot, 2004).
Board independence is a key attribute to an effective board and has been the focus of
most corporate governance reforms across the world. It has been argued that for the board
to be an effective monitor, it must comprise a majority of independent outsiders. A higher
percentage of outside independent directors on the board may reduce the divergence
between the interests of shareholders and management and may prove more efﬁcient in the
monitoring and advising functions and thus would improve management performance
(Andres et al., 2005). Board independence has been found to be signiﬁcant in mitigating
agency costs (McKnight andMira, 2003; Henry, 2004) and improving corporate performance
(Prentice and Spence, 2007; Chau and Gray, 2010).
CEO duality refers to the situation when the same individual occupies both the Chief
Executive Ofﬁcer (CEO) and board chair positions in a corporation. CEO duality has been
the subject of an ongoing debate between two schools of thought, agency theory and
stewardship theory. Agency theorists argue that the CEO duality leadership enables the
concentration of power and authority in one person, enabling him/her to dominate the board
and thus reduces board effectiveness in its monitoring and controlling functions (Fama and
Jensen, 1983; Westphal and Zajac, 1998). Habib and Hossain (2012) concluded that CEO
duality might prevent the board from properly monitoring the actions of the CEO and thus
compromise the ﬁrm value and performance. Therefore, agency theory recommends
separation between CEO and board chair functions, as this separation would result in more
effective monitoring. In contrast, stewardship theory argues that CEO duality leadership
can better serve the ﬁrm and its shareholders (Davis et al., 1997). According to this theory,
the duality structure establishes strong and unambiguous leadership embodied in a unity of
command and companies with CEO duality can make better and quicker decisions
(Donaldson and Davis, 1991). Empirical evidence, however, on CEO duality is mixed and
inconclusive.
The arguments and ﬁndings discussed above on how the attributes of a board might
inﬂuence the effectiveness of other governance mechanisms generally, and the ACs
speciﬁcally, are mixed, and the direction of the effect is not uniform. As a result, the
following hypothesis will be tested:
H1. An effective board acts as a complement (substitute) mechanism for AC
effectiveness.
Ownership concentration. Corporate ownership structures vary among companies and
across countries. While in some companies ownership is dominated by controlling
shareholders (concentrated ownership structure), ownership in other companies is widely
dispersed with many individual shareholders each of whom has a small number of shares.
Most prior studies claimed that dispersed ownership is a common denominator across the
Anglo-American countries. The basic conﬂict of interest in the Anglo-American countries
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(notably the USA and the UK) is between strong managers and widely dispersed weak
shareholders principal-agent (PA) conﬂict. Research showed increasing ownership
concentration is used in these countries as an internal mechanism to mitigate agency conﬂict
between shareholders andmanagers (Anderson and Reeb, 2003). Large shareholders such as
government representatives, institutional investors and investors with large holdings are
likely to have more incentives and resources to efﬁciently monitor management (Jensen and
Meckling, 1976; Schleifer and Vishny, 1986). Many studies (Feldmann and Schwarzkopf,
2003; Pucheta-Martínez and De Fuentes, 2007) documented that ownership concentration
and AC are complementary mechanisms of corporate governance. Although concentrated
ownership mitigates PA conﬂict in developed markets, it could be a major cause of the PP
conﬂict in emerging markets (Lin and Chuang, 2011; Peng, 2009; Yiyi et al., 2008). The PP
conﬂict is regarded as a major problem in emergingmarkets which are characterized by lack
of legal protection and weak governance, including expropriation of minority shareholders
(Claessens et al., 2000; Faccio et al., 2001; Mitton, 2002). Large shareholders usually
participate in management themselves or appoint representatives to the board and
management positions (La Porta et al., 1998) and thus have a high level of inﬂuence to
enhance their interests at the expense of minority shareholders who have little inﬂuence.
Therefore, many studies have shown negative association between ownership concentration
and ﬁrm performance (Filatotchev et al., 2001; Ivashkovskaya and Stepanova, 2011; Stancić
et al., 2012). This implies that ownership concentration may serve as a substitute to other
governance mechanisms, such as the AC, in monitoring management.
Ownership structure in UAE companies is characterized by a signiﬁcant degree of
institutional and government ownership concentration. Hussainey and Aljifri (2012)
reported that 30 per cent of UAE listed companies are held by institutional investors, and 11
per cent are owned by the government. This study identiﬁed three major categories of
ownership concentration in the UAE: government ownership, institutional investors and
investors with large holdings. Like some emerging economies, although the conﬂict of
interest between shareholders and managers (PA conﬂict) still prevails in the the UAE
context, companies in the country further suffer from a severe information asymmetry
between majority and minority shareholders (PP conﬂict) (Su et al., 2008; Rogers et al., 2008).
As such, to examine whether UAE listed companies use ownership concentration to
complement or substitute for other corporate governance mechanism (e.g. the AC), the
following hypothesis is developed:
H2. Ownership concentration acts as a complement (substitute) mechanism for AC
effectiveness.
Control variables
Besides the use of the independent variables, the model also uses four control variables: ﬁrm
size, auditor type, industry type and ﬁrm’s proﬁtability. Previous literature suggests that
these variables can inﬂuence sound corporate governance structure. Many studies in recent
literature pointed to a positive association between ﬁrm size and internal monitoring (Boone
et al., 2007; Guest, 2009). Large companies are vulnerable to high agency costs resulting
from conﬂicts between management and stakeholders and tend to reduce such costs by
adopting sound governance mechanisms such as effective ACs. Moreover, as large
companies are more likely to seek external ﬁnance than small ones, they tend to establish a
good governance structure to attract and assure prospective investors in the capital market.
A positive link between ﬁrm size and AC formation has been reported by prior scholars
(Firth et al., 2007; Benzing et al., 2011). In this respect, it is important to mention that the
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average size of Emirati companies listed on the national stock exchanges is relatively small
in comparison with the average size of companies in the USA. For example, the average
market capitalization of companies listed on UAE stock exchanges in 2013 was US$1.5bn in
comparison with US$5.7bn in the USA (World Bank, 2015).
Big Four international audit ﬁrms are more likely to encourage good corporate
governance practices and to promote ACs among their clients (Turley and Zaman, 2004).
Large international audit ﬁrms have more concern for their reputation than small ones, and
hence they are usually willing to engage with clients to demonstrate a commitment to sound
governance. Moreover, the existence of an effective AC is important to large audit ﬁrms
because such a governance mechanism protects auditors from unnecessary pressures that
may expose them to unethical conduct and hence to preserve auditors’ independence (Kirk
and Siegel, 1996, Klein, 2002). In this respect, Eichenseher and Shields (1985) found an
association between a ﬁrm having an AC and having a large independent auditor.
Hutchinson and Gul (2004) suggested that ﬁrms in a speciﬁc industry might adopt
particular corporate governance practices. Therefore, industry type is included as a control
variable. The non-ﬁnancial sectors were broadly classiﬁed into four sectors: manufacturing,
service, construction and consumer staples. The construction sector is excluded from the
model to serve as a benchmark for the included sectors. The construction sector was chosen
to serve as a benchmark as it, in comparison to other industries, operates in a high-risk
environment (Loosemore et al., 2005). To ensure the effectiveness of the risk management
strategies in this risky sector and enhance the investors’ conﬁdence in these strategies, this
industry is expected to establish active ACs as well as risk management committees
(Petrovic-Lazarevic and Djordjevic, 2002). In the UAE context, additionally to its risky
environment that requires active governance mechanisms like other countries, the
construction sector makes an immense contribution to the economic growth of the country
(Alzarooni, 2014). In this respect, Essig and Batran (2005) noticed that most of the
investments in the UAEwere oriented towards the construction industry.
As for the relationship between proﬁtability and corporate governance quality, proﬁtable
companies would give signals to regain the trust of the market through adopting a set of
“governance best practices”. These proﬁtable companies have incentives to distinguish
themselves from less proﬁtable ones by following best practices as such practices enhance
ﬁrm’s ability to raise capital at the lowest possible cost. Some research ﬁndings supported
this argument and showed proﬁtability positively impacts the adoption of sound corporate
governance practices (Black et al., 2006; Silveira et al., 2007).
Data collection and methodology
Data collection
As mentioned earlier, this study only covers non-ﬁnancial companies listed on the UAE
Stock Exchanges during the period 2011-2013. All ﬁnancial companies (banking and
insurance) were excluded because the nature of these companies, their regulatory
environment and capital structures are different than non-ﬁnancial companies. Initially, all
the 55 non-ﬁnancial listed companies were included in the sample. However, seven
companies with missing data related to variables used in the study for the duration of the
three years were excluded. Thus, the ﬁnal sample consisted of 48 companies over three
years (144 observations). Data on corporate governance variables (both dependent and
independent variables) were obtained from sampled companies’ corporate governance
reports. The listing requirements require all listed companies to publish separate annual
corporate governance reports. The reports include details about the board of directors, board
committees, external auditor and shareholding structure. Data on total assets, sales, net
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income and external auditor (control variables) were manually gathered from the annual
reports published by sampled listed companies. The annual and corporate governance
reports of the listed companies are usually posted for public viewing on companies’websites
as well as at the stock markets’ websites where these companies are listed. In this study,
electronic versions of both annual and corporate governance reports of the respective ﬁrms
were downloaded from the Abu Dhabi Securities Exchange (ADX) and Dubai Financial
Market (DFM) websites.
Drawing upon Smith (2003) used by Zaman and Valentincic (2011) and Naser et al. (2014),
this study uses four features of the AC (dependent variable) to measure its effectiveness:
audit committee size (ACS), audit committee independence (ACI), audit committee diligence
(ACD) and audit committee ﬁnancial expertise (ACF). Under the assumption that AC
features are equally important, an unweighted approach is applied in this study by
assigning a dichotomous score for each of the four features of the AC as follows:
 ACS: A score of one (1) is assigned to the ﬁrm if the board size is >3; 0 score if size
#3;
 ACI: A score of one (1) is assigned to the ﬁrm if all AC members are independent; 0
score otherwise;
 ACD: A score of one (1) is assigned to the ﬁrm if the AC held > 4 meetings; 0 score
otherwise; and
 ACF: A score of one (1) is assigned to the ﬁrm if more than one of the AC members
has ﬁnancial expertise; 0 score otherwise.
The audit committee effectiveness of a particular ﬁrm (ACE) is measured as the average
score of the four indicators of the AC:
ACE¼ðACSþACI þACDþACFÞ = 4
The independent variables include a set of corporate governance mechanisms, namely, board
size, percentage of independent board members, CEO duality, government ownership,
institutional ownership and major shareholders. In addition to these corporate governance and
ownership structure variables, four control variables for companies’ characteristics that may
affect their ﬁnancial performance are included in the model. These control variables are the
corporate size, auditor type, industry type and proﬁtability. Deﬁnitions and measurements of
the independent and control variables used in the study are described in Table I.
Statistical methods
To investigate the above research hypotheses, the following multiple logistic regression
model will be used:
Logit p ið Þ ¼ ln pi1 pi
 
¼ b 0 þ b 1BSIZE þ b 2BINDþ b 3DUAL
þ b 4INST þ b 5GOV þ b 6MAJ þ b 7AUDT þ b 8FSIZE
þ b 9PROF þ b 10MANF þ b 11SERV þ b 12STAP þ «
where, p i represents the audit committee effectiveness level of the i
th company, b 0 to b 12
are the model parameters, and « is a random error.
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Empirical results
ACE index validity and reliability
Although the four indicators constituting the proposed ACE index were most frequently
used in empirical research on AC effectiveness, the validity and reliability of this construct
have never been investigated. Before examining this issue, it is crucial ﬁrst to emphasize the
formative nature of the ACE construct, rather than the reﬂective nature, as the four
indicators are covering different sides of AC effectiveness. A four-point criterion for
determining the nature of constructs has been widely used in organizational research
(Diamantopoulos andWinklhofer, 2001; Jarvis et al., 2003; Petter et al., 2007; Hair et al., 2016).
This criterion requires examining the indicators for their:
 causal priority with the construct;
 mutual interchangeability;
 joint covariation; and
 nomological net.
First, the four indicators have been used collectively to constitute the construct of AC
effectiveness. Analogous to the argument introduced by Peng and Lai (2012) on operational
performance, the assumption of the existence of an underlying latent construct of AC
effectiveness that induces changes in the AC size, diligence, ﬁnancial expertise and
independence is not plausible. Conceptually, researchers cannot expect that an underlying
construct of AC effectiveness causes the four components to all change in the same direction,
but on the contrary, the AC effectiveness will be a consequence of the changes in AC size,
diligence, ﬁnancial expertise and independence. Second, the four indicators are not
interchangeable; for example, the indicator used to measure the AC ﬁnancial expertise
Table I.
Independent
variables, deﬁnitions
and sources
Variables Operationalization Data source
Board Size (BSIZE) The total number of board directors of ﬁrm Company corporate
governance report
Board Independence
(BIND)
Number of independent board members of ﬁrm
divided by total number of board members
Company corporate
governance report
CEO Duality (DUAL) Dummy, 1 for a duality ﬁrm and 0 otherwise Company corporate
governance report
Institutional Ownership
(INST)
Percentage of ordinary shares of ﬁrm held by
institutional investors
Company corporate
governance report
Government Ownership
(GOV)
Percentage of a ﬁrm’s ordinary shares held by
government
Company corporate
governance report
Major Shareholders
(MAJ)
Percentage of ordinary shares owned by
shareholders having a minimum of 5 per cent of ﬁrm
Company corporate
governance report
Auditor Type (AUDT) Dummy variable: (1) score is given to a local ﬁrm
afﬁliated to a big international ﬁrm; (0) score is given
to a local audit ﬁrm
Company corporate
governance report/
Company annual report
Firm Size (FSIZE) Natural logarithm of total assets of ﬁrm Company annual report
Proﬁtability (PROF) Net income to net sales of ﬁrm Company annual report
Manufacturing sector
(MANF)
Dummy, 1 if a ﬁrm operates in a manufacturing
sector and 0 otherwise
Company annual report
Service sector (SERV) Dummy, 1 if a ﬁrm operates in a service sector; 0
otherwise
Company annual report
Consumer Staples
sector (STAP)
Dummy, 1 if a ﬁrm operates in a consumer staples
sector; 0 otherwise
Company annual report
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cannot be used as a proxy for AC independence. Third, it is not necessary that a change in
one AC effectiveness indicator will be associated with similar changes in other indicators.
For instance, a larger AC is not necessarily associated with more AC meetings. Finally, the
considered indicators are not required to have the same antecedents and consequences. For
example, the driver for increasing the AC size is not necessary a driver for increasing the
number of AC members with ﬁnancial expertise. At the same time, increasing AC size and
AC ﬁnancial expertise will not necessarily lead to similar results, as they are capturing
different aspects of AC effectiveness. Hence, it is important to treat the ACE index as a
formative construct and use the relevant measures for assessing its validity and reliability.
It is worth noting that validity assessment is one of the most controversial issues in
formative measurement literature where some researchers reject using quantitative
measures, while others indicate the applicability of limited statistical procedures
(Diamantopoulos et al., 2008). The proposed statistical procedures cover individual indicator
validity (Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer, 2001) and construct validity (Jarvis et al., 2003;
MacKenzie et al., 2005; Diamantopoulos and Siguaw, 2006; Diamantopoulos, 2006; Edwards,
2001). However, these procedures are used to examine the construct validity of formative
constructs only in models including reﬂective constructs besides the formative ones using
partial least squares (PLS) methods. In such models, the formative construct serves as an
antecedent for other formative or reﬂective constructs. Hence, in our model, the
aforementioned techniques are inapplicable, as the ACE index serves as a dependent
variable only.
Although examining construct validity is not possible in our model, nevertheless, we can
examine the content validity of the ACE index. Petter et al. (2007) indicated that content
validity is particularly important for formative constructs, and testing it should be a
mandatory practice for assessing formative constructs. Furthermore, Petter et al. (2007)
recommended examining content validity using a thorough literature review related to the
conceptual domain of the construct. As presented earlier, the four indicators forming the
ACE index have been frequently used collectively in measuring the AC effectiveness (Lin
et al., 2006; Pucheta-Martínez and De Fuentes, 2007; O’Sullivan et al., 2008; Aldamen et al.,
2012; de Andrés Suárez et al., 2013; Abdel-Meguid et al., 2014; Bin-Ghanem and Ariff, 2016;
WanMohammad et al., 2016). This high consensus on the use of these constituent indicators
testiﬁes to the content validity of the ACE index.
Unlike the indicators in reﬂective constructs, the high correlations among the constituent
indicators, and hence the high internal consistency, of formative constructs are undesirable
(Jarvis et al., 2003; Diamantopoulos et al., 2008; Peng and Lai, 2012). This means that
multicollinearity poses more of a problem in formative measures (Peng and Lai, 2012).
Hence, to examine the reliability of formative constructs, it is common to ensure that the
variance inﬂation factor (VIF) values of the formative measures are below 3.3
(Diamantopoulos and Siguaw, 2006). For the ACE index, the VIF values of ACS, ACI, ACF
and ACM were 1.23, 1.05, 1.03 and 1.20, respectively. All the VIF values are less than 3.3
indicating that multicollinearity does not represent a problem to the reliability of the ACE
index.
Descriptive statistics and correlation analysis
Table II presents the average score of the individual ACE components over the period 2011-
2013. It can be deduced from the table that there has been a drastic increase of 15 per cent in
the AC diligence (from 33 to 48 per cent) and inclusion of ﬁnancial expertise (from 8 to 23 per
cent) from 2011 to 2012. This suggests that only two of the AC attributes (AC diligence and
AC ﬁnancial expertise) have become more active over our three-year study period. This is
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due to the fact that corporate governance just became effective and more companies started
to publish their governance report. By 2012, most of the companies had already published
their governance report in compliance with the governance codes. Hence, little changes
occurred in the number of companies publishing their governance report in 2013, as almost
all of them published their report this year or the year before. However, no remarkable
changes occurred on other components of AC. Around one-quarter of the companies have
ACs composed of at least four members, while these committees are fully composed of
independent members in more than a half of the companies.
Table III provides descriptive statistics of the ACE Index and the independent variables
during the period between 2011 and 2013. The results indicate a remarkable improvement in
the AC effectiveness of the listed companies from the year 2011 to 2013. This is attributed to
the increase in the diligence and ﬁnancial expertise components of the ACE index as
discussed earlier. Over the three-year period, there were no notable changes in the
independent variables except CEO duality and proﬁtability. The percentage of companies
with CEO duality has jumped from 12.5 per cent in 2011 to 20.8 per cent in 2012 but has
dropped to 16.7 per cent in 2013. Moreover, the proﬁtability witnessed around 50 per cent
drop from 0.072 in 2012 to 0.037 in 2013.
The correlation matrix for the ACE index and the nine independent variables is reported
in Table IV. The results indicate that companies with larger board size, more independent
board and a big four external auditor tend to have a more effective AC. Moreover, as the
shares of institutional investors and major shareholders increase, the AC is expected to be
less effective. On the other hand, the results showed weak to moderate correlations amongst
the independent variables (r ranged from 0.464 to 0.368), indicating no signs of
multicollinearity.
Logistic regression analysis
Due to the panel data context, the random effect logistic model was ﬁrst ﬁt to model the
probability of AC effectiveness. Based on the likelihood-ratio test, the intra-class correlation
coefﬁcient (6.42 108) for the model was insigniﬁcant (x 2 0, P-value 1). Moreover, the
estimates under the random-effect model and the pooled model are largely identical. This
indicates that there is no need to include the panel-level variation component in the model
and supports the preference of the pooled logistic model over the random-effect logistic
model.
Table V presents the results of the logistic model of the AC effectiveness index. Based on
the likelihood ratio test, the logistic model is highly signiﬁcant (x 2 = 70.04, P-value = 0.000)
and successfully explained around 48 per cent of the variation in the AC effectiveness index.
Moreover, the Hosmer – Lemeshow test indicates a satisfactory model ﬁt (x 2 = 6.19,
P-value = 0.4018). With regard to individual predictors, the regression results indicated that
board independence, institutional ownership, major shareholders, ﬁrm size, manufacturing
and service sectors are signiﬁcantly related to the effectiveness of the AC at the 5 per cent
Table II.
Descriptive statistics
for the ACE
components
Year AC size AC independence AC diligence AC financial expertise
2011 0.27 0.56 0.33 0.08
2012 0.25 0.56 0.48 0.23
2013 0.27 0.50 0.46 0.25
Pooled 0.26 0.54 0.42 0.19
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level, while a signiﬁcant effect of each of board size and CEO duality has been observed at
the 10 per cent level.
The board independence (BIND) seems to be a major determinant of AC effectiveness. A
positive and highly signiﬁcant association has been reported between BIND and the AC
effectiveness. This result suggests that companies with boards having higher percentage of
independent directors are more likely to have effective ACs. This ﬁnding is not surprising as
many previous studies documented that boards with more independent directors are more
effective in performing their monitoring function and are more likely to alleviate any conﬂict
of interest between investors andmanagers and work for the shareholders’ interest (Peasnell
et al., 2005; Mather and Ramsay, 2006; García-Meca and Sánchez-Ballesta, 2009). A positive
Table III.
Descriptive statistics
for dependent and
independent
variables 2011-2013
Variable Year n Mean SD Minimum Maximum
ACE 2011 48 0.313 0.250 0 1
2012 48 0.380 0.231 0 0.75
2013 48 0.370 0.263 0 1
Pooled 144 0.354 0.248 0 1
BDSIZE 2011 48 7.813 2.120 5 17
2012 48 7.938 2.273 5 18
2013 48 8.000 2.212 5 17
Pooled 144 7.917 2.189 5 18
BIND 2011 48 0.692 0.202 0.333 1
2012 48 0.704 0.206 0.333 1
2013 48 0.710 0.201 0.333 1
Pooled 144 0.702 0.201 0.333 1
DUAL 2011 48 0.125 0.334 0 1
2012 48 0.208 0.410 0 1
2013 48 0.167 0.377 0 1
Pooled 144 0.167 0.374 0 1
GOVRN 2011 48 0.124 0.195 0 0.725
2012 48 0.135 0.195 0 0.726
2013 48 0.142 0.200 0 0.726
Pooled 144 0.134 0.195 0 0.726
INSTIT 2011 48 0.384 0.268 0 0.942
2012 48 0.404 0.256 0 0.940
2013 48 0.382 0.260 0 0.940
Pooled 144 0.390 0.260 0 0.942
MAJ 2011 48 0.502 0.243 0 0.930
2012 48 0.508 0.240 0 0.931
2013 48 0.498 0.250 0 1
Pooled 144 0.503 0.243 0 1
AUDT 2011 48 0.833 0.377 0 1
2012 48 0.813 0.394 0 1
2013 48 0.792 0.410 0 1
Pooled 144 0.813 0.392 0 1
FSIZE 2011 48 21.639 1.646 17.843 25.466
2012 48 21.654 1.646 17.857 25.532
2013 48 21.589 1.988 14.931 25.527
Pooled 144 21.627 1.755 14.931 25.532
PROF 2011 48 0.071 0.166 0.540 0.380
2012 48 0.072 0.191 0.730 0.460
2013 48 0.037 1.071 6.790 1.990
Pooled 144 0.060 0.631 6.790 1.990
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and marginally signiﬁcant (at a 10 per cent signiﬁcance level) association has been reported
between board size (BSIZE) and AC effectiveness. This result supports some earlier ﬁndings
that showed a signiﬁcant and positive association between board size and the voluntary
formation/effectiveness of the AC (Piot, 2004; Firth et al., 2007; Benzing et al., 2011; Abdel-
Meguid et al., 2014). On the other hand, a marginally signiﬁcantly (at a 10 per cent level)
negative association has been reported between CEO duality and AC effectiveness
suggesting that the dual role of CEO and board chair would reduce the effectiveness of the
AC. This result is consistent with prior studies in other countries (Davidson III et al., 2004;
Chen et al., 2009; Abdel-Meguid et al., 2014). This ﬁnding may be explained by the fact that a
large board could be more effective as it can be drawn from a wider range of talented,
experienced independent directors and can delegate duties more efﬁciently among board
members. This, in turn, will enable AC members to devote sufﬁcient time and effort to their
responsibilities on the committee. This result provides support for the complementary
Table IV.
Pearson correlation
coefﬁcients
Variable ACE BDSIZE BIND DUAL AUDT GOVRN INSTIT MAJ FSIZE PROF
ACE 1.000
BDSIZE 0.422** 1.000
BIND 0.440** 0.124 1.000
DUAL 0.113 0.077 0.223** 1.000
AUDT 0.292** 0.129 0.018 0.024 1.000
GOVRN 0.144 0.035 0.207* 0.042 0.124 1.000
INSTIT 0.263** 0.064 0.130 0.011 0.129 0.464** 1.000
MAJ 0.336** 0.303** 0.049 0.218** 0.251** 0.203* 0.211* 1.000
FSIZE 0.434** 0.331** 0.127 0.004 0.368** 0.220** 0.002 0.288** 1.000
PROF 0.137 0.035 0.064 0.053 0.010 0.046 0.037 0.086 0.063 1.000
Notes: *Correlation is signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level; ** Correlation is signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level
Table V.
Pooled logistic
regression model
with ACE as a
dependent variable
Variable B z P-value
Regression coefﬁcients
Constant 21.046 2.59 0.010
BSIZE 0.386 1.75 0.081
BIND 10.091 3.95 0.000
DUAL 1.688 1.81 0.070
GOVRN 2.947 1.32 0.185
INSTIT 5.842 3.53 0.000
MAJ 5.627 2.17 0.030
AUDITOR 0.041 0.05 0.958
SIZE 0.756 2.62 0.009
PROF 0.271 0.55 0.580
MANF 3.280 2.17 0.030
STAP 0.811 0.44 0.657
SERV 2.857 2.11 0.035
Model diagnostics
Likelihood ratio test x 2 = 70.04, P-value = 0.0000
Hosmer–Lemeshow test x 2 = 6.19, P-value = 0.4018
Pseudo R2 0.4841
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theory (Hoskisson et al., 2009; Schepker and Oh, 2013) suggesting that one governance
mechanism could improve the effectiveness of another mechanism. According to this theory,
one governance mechanism (AC) becomes more effective through “mutual enhancement”
when it is combined with another effective governance mechanism (board of directors)
(Aguilera et al., 2008). Therefore, it is appropriate to suggest that ACs in the Emirati context
are more likely to be effective when complemented with a well-functioning board
characterized by a large size, a high level of board independence and non-CEO duality
leadership style.
As for the ownership structure variables, Table V indicates that institutional ownership
(INSTIT) is negatively and signiﬁcantly correlated with AC effectiveness. Those investors
usually use their high level of inﬂuence on companies through their board representatives to
extract private beneﬁts unavailable to minority shareholders. As such, they have little
incentives to have effective ACs, as the information asymmetry and conﬂict of interest
between management and such controlling shareholders can be resolved through direct
contact and by using their inﬂuential position within the company. Instead, companies with
high levels of institutional ownership are more prone to severe PP conﬂict of interest
between those controlling shareholders and minority investors. This ﬁnding is in line with
Hassan and Hijazi (2015), who found negative and marginally signiﬁcant association
between institutional ownership and the formation of an AC in Palestine. However, this
ﬁnding is contrary to Pucheta-Martínez and De Fuentes (2007) who found that institutional
investors have more inﬂuence than individual investors in the formation of ACs in Spain.
This ﬁnding suggests that institutional investors may act as a substitute mechanism to the
alternative corporate governance reforms such as AC. A negative association between
government ownership (GOV) and AC effectiveness was also observed, although it was
statistically insigniﬁcant. However, a positive association was found between large
shareholders who own at least 5 per cent of a corporation’s issued shares (MAJ) and ACE.
This ﬁnding can be explained on the grounds that the percentage of shares holding by every
individual investor in the Emirati listed companies is not high enough to constitute a
“block”. Therefore, no large shareholders can extract private beneﬁts and thus they are more
likely to cooperate with other shareholders to monitor management.
This ﬁnding is consistent with the substitution theory, suggesting that governance
mechanisms “effectively substitute for one another and/or operate in concert” (Dalton et al.,
2003). According to this theory, the marginal effects of one governance mechanism (AC) on
organizational outcomes may be reduced by the existence of another potentially effective
corporate governance mechanism (institutional ownership) (Rediker and Seth, 1995; Ward
et al., 2009).
Turning to the control variables, Table V shows that the AC effectiveness is positively
related to each of the ﬁrm size (SIZE), proﬁtability (PROF) and auditor type (AUDITOR).
However, only the ﬁrm size variable is found to be statistically signiﬁcant. This ﬁnding is
consistent with prior literature (Firth et al., 2007; Raghunandan and Rama, 2007) that found
a positive association between ﬁrm size and audit committee effectiveness. Large companies
are more complex to audit than smaller ones and, therefore, need to have active ACs to deal
with accounting issues.
To examine the robustness of the main results, additional tests were conducted. First, we
added leverage and audit fees as control variables in the model. Highly leveraged ﬁrms are
more likely to provide signals to existing and potential debt holders and creditors that they
pay more attention to good corporate governance practices such as formation of active ACs.
High audit fees are associated with audit quality, as more audit time and effort are spent by
auditors doing their jobs. To assure investors, creditors and other stakeholders about the
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credibility of their accounting information, ﬁrms with sound corporate governance structure
(including an effective AC) are more likely to engage with highly paid external auditors
providing high-quality services. We also used the number of shareholders who own 5
per cent or more of outstanding shares instead of the percentage of such shareholders. To
control for unobserved factors that may affect all companies over the year, we include year
ﬁxed effects. Additionally, we used a probit model to check the robustness of the logit
model. Generally, the results of these investigations were largely consistent with those
presented in Table V. It is worth noting that, based on our earlier discussion on the selection
of independent variables, the ACE model is well-speciﬁed in terms of appropriateness and
sufﬁciency of variables included in the model. This ensures the nonexistence of endogenous
predictors in themodel.
Conclusion
While some of the previous literature supported the complementarily view of the
relationship between corporate governance devices on the presence and/or
effectiveness of an AC, other studies have supported the substitution hypothesis. In this
study, we examine whether AC serves as a substitute or a complement mechanism to
other corporate governance reforms among non-ﬁnancial companies listed on UAE
Stock Markets during the period 2011-2013. Data were collected from the annual reports
and corporate governance reports of all non-ﬁnancial companies listed on the two
exchanges for the years 2011-2013.
The effectiveness of the AC is measured by constructing an index comprising four
features of the AC: audit committee size (ACS), audit committee independence (ACI), audit
committee diligence (ACD) and audit committee ﬁnancial expertise (ACF). Logistic
regression analysis was conducted to analyze the relationship between ACE and a set of
corporate governance mechanisms, namely, board size, percentage of independent board
members, CEO duality, government ownership, institutional ownership and major
shareholders.
The result of the analysis documents three main conclusions. First, different corporate
governance mechanisms, including ownership structure, are interrelated in an emerging
economy such as UAE characterized by highly concentrated ownership and weak investor
protection. Substitution and/or complementary effects of the different governance
mechanisms exist. Second, board characteristics (measured by size, independence and CEO-
duality) appear to serve as a complement to AC effectiveness. Companies with larger boards
and higher level of board independence are more likely to have effective ACs. This indicates
that the corporate board and its committees, including the AC, constitute a key mechanism
of alleviating the agency problem between managers and shareholders. Third, ownership
concentration, represented by the institutional investors, substitutes for audit committee
effectiveness. This suggests that those controlling investors use their power and inﬂuence to
substitute for the effective ACs in controlling agency problems with companies’
managements.
The importance of the current study stems from the fact that it provides valuable
insights into the interaction between various corporate governance mechanisms in the UAE.
The ﬁndings may help regulators to introduce any changes deemed necessary to promote
good corporate governance practices in the country.
This study is not without limitations. As the study uses UAE data, the study ﬁndings
should be generalized cautiously to stock markets in other countries that have different
regulations and economic characteristics. Furthermore, the study examines the inﬂuence of
a certain set of corporate governance factors on the effectiveness of AC. However, other
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corporate governance mechanisms may contribute to the effectiveness of AC. Another major
limitation of the current study is the relatively small sample. The small sample size is
inevitable because of the limited number of UAE listed ﬁrms. The current ﬁndings should,
therefore, be treated with the utmost caution.
As corporate governance is still at its infancy stage in the UAE, this paper presents a
preliminary evidence on the AC effectiveness and the interaction between AC and other
corporate governance mechanisms. Future research in the UAE context is therefore needed
to validate our ﬁndings.
Note
1. According to the world development indicators published by the World Bank in 2015, Saudi
Arabia GDP was US$646bn, UAE $370.3bn and Egypt $331bn.
References
Abbott, L.J., Parker, S. and Peters, G.F. (2004), “Audit committee characteristics and restatements”,
Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, Vol. 23 No. 1, pp. 69-87.
Abdel-Meguid, A., Samaha, K. and Dahawy, K. (2014), “Preliminary evidence on the relationship
between corporate governance attributes and audit committee functionality in Egypt: beyond
checking the box”, Corporate Governance, Vol. 14 No. 2, pp. 197-210.
Acharya, V.V., Myers, S.C. and Rajan, R.G. (2011), “The internal governance of ﬁrms”, The Journal of
Finance, Vol. 66 No. 3, pp. 689-720.
Aguilera, R.V. and Crespi-Cladera, R. (2012), “Firm family ﬁrms: current debates of corporate
governance in family ﬁrms”, Journal of Family Business Strategy, Vol. 3 No. 2, pp. 66-69.
Aguilera, R.V., Filatotchev, I., Gospel, H. and Jackson, G. (2008), “An organizational approach to
comparative corporate governance: costs, contingencies, and complementarities”, Organization
Science, Vol. 19 No. 3, pp. 475-492.
Akhtaruddin, M., Hossain, M.A., Hossain, M. and Yao, L. (2009), “Corporate governance and voluntary
disclosure in corporate annual reports of Malaysian listed ﬁrm”, Journal of Applied Management
Accounting Research, Vol. 7 No. 1, pp. 1-19.
Al-Baidhani, A.M. (2014), “Review of corporate governance bundle”, Corporate Ownership and Control,
Vol. 11 No. 4, pp. 236-241.
Aldamen, H., Duncan, K., Kelly, S., McNamara, R. and Nagel, S. (2012), “Audit committee
characteristics and ﬁrm performance during the global ﬁnancial crisis”, Accounting and
Finance, Vol. 52 No. 4, pp. 971-1000.
Al-Najjar, B. (2011), “The determinants of audit committee independence and activity: evidence from
the UK”, International Journal of Auditing, Vol. 15 No. 2, pp. 191-203.
Alzarooni, K. (2014), “The Challenges of Corporate Governance Systems for Construction Project
Management”, Master Thesis, The British University in Dubai, Dubai.
Anderson, R.C. and Reeb, D.M. (2003), “Founding family ownership and the agency cost of debt”,
Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 66 No. 3, pp. 263-285.
Andres, P., Azofra, V. and Lopez, F.J. (2005), “Corporate boards in OECD countries: size composition,
compensation, functioning and effectiveness”, Corporate Governance: An International Review,
Vol. 13, pp. 197-210.
Aoki, M. (2002), “Toward a comparative institutional analysis”, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical
Economics, Vol. 158 No. 4, pp. 735-737.
Baydoun, N., Maguire, W., Ryan, N. and Willett, R. (2013), “Corporate governance in ﬁve Arabian
countries”,Managerial Auditing Journal, Vol. 28 No. 1, pp. 7-22.
MAJ
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 B
irz
ei
t U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 A
t 0
4:
46
 1
5 
A
ug
us
t 2
01
7 
(P
T)
Bedard, J., Chtourou, S.M. and Courteau, L. (2004), “The effect of audit committee expertise,
independence, and activity on aggressive earnings management”, Auditing: A Journal of
Practice & TheoryVol. 23 No. 2, pp. 13-35.
Belkhir, M. (2009), “Board of directors’ size and performance in the banking industry”, International
Journal of Managerial Finance, Vol. 5 No. 2, pp. 201-221.
Benzing, C., Leach, E. and McGee, C. (2011), “Sarbanes-Oxley and the new form 990”, Nonproﬁt and
Voluntary Sector Quarterly, Vol. 40 No. 6, pp. 1132 -1147.
Bin-Ghanem, H. and Ariff, A.M. (2016), “The effect of board of directors and audit committee
effectiveness on internet ﬁnancial reporting: evidence from gulf co-operation council countries”,
Journal of Accounting in Emerging Economies, Vol. 6 No. 4, pp. 429-448.
Black, B.S., Jang, H. and Kim,W. (2006), “Predicting ﬁrms’ corporate governance choices: evidence from
Korea”, Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 12 No. 3, pp. 660-691.
Boone, A.L., Field, L.C., Karpoff, J.M. and Raheja, C.G. (2007), “The determinants of corporate board size
and composition: an empirical analysis”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 85 No. 1, pp. 66-101.
Bradbury, M.E. (1990), “The incentives for voluntary audit committee formation”, Journal of
Accounting and Public Policy, Vol. 9 No. 1, pp. 19-36.
Bushman, R., Chen, Q., Engel, E. and Smith, A. (2004), “Financial accounting information,
organizational complexity and corporate governance system”, Journal of Accounting and
Economics, Vol. 37 No. 2, pp. 167-201.
Cassiman, B. and Veugelers, R. (2006), “In search of complementarity in innovation strategy: internal
R&D and external knowledge acquisition”,Management Science, Vol. 52 No. 1, pp. 68-82.
Chau, G. and Gray, S.J. (2010), “Family ownership, board independence and voluntary disclosure:
evidence from Hong Kong”, Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, Vol. 19
No. 2, pp. 93-109.
Chen, G.M., Firth, L. and Xu, (2009), “Does the type of ownership control matter? Evidence from China’s
listed companies”, Journal of Banking & Finance, Vol. 33 No. 1, pp. 171-181.
Cheng, S. (2008), “Board size and variability of corporate performance”, Journal of Financial Economics,
Vol. 87 No. 2, pp. 157-176.
Claessens, S., Djankov, S. and Lang, L.H. (2000), “The separation of ownership and control in East
Asian corporations”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 58 No. 1, pp. 81-112.
Cremers, K. and Nair, V.B. (2005), “Governance mechanisms and equity prices”,The Journal of Finance,
Vol. 60 No. 6, pp. 2859-2894.
Dalton, D.R., Daily, C.M., Certo, S.T. and Roengpitya, R. (2003), “Meta-analyses of ﬁnancial
performance and equity: fusion or confusion?”, Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 46
No. 1, pp. 13-26.
Davis, J.H., Schoorman, F.D. and Donaldson, L. (1997), “Toward a stewardship theory of management”,
Academy ofManagement Review, Vol. 2 No. 1, pp. 20-47.
Davidson III, W.N., Xie, B. and Xu, W. (2004), “Market reaction to voluntary announcements of audit
committee appointments: the effect of ﬁnancial expertise”, Journal of Accounting and Public
Policy, Vol. 23 No. 4, pp. 279.
DeFond, M.L. and Francis, J.R. (2005), “Audit research after Sarbanes-Oxley”, Auditing: A Journal of
Practice & Theory, Vol. 24 No. 1, pp. 5-30.
de Andrés Suárez, J., García, E.C., Méndez, C.F. and Gutiérrez, C.R. (2013), “The effectiveness of the
audit committee in Spain: implications of its existence on the auditor’s opinion”, SERIEs, Vol. 4
No. 3, pp. 333-352.
DeZoort, F.T. and Salterio, S.E. (2001), “The effects of corporate governance experience and ﬁnancial-
reporting and audit knowledge on audit committee members’ judgments”, Auditing: A Journal
of Practice & Theory, Vol. 20 No. 2, pp. 31-47.
Corporate
governance
mechanisms
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 B
irz
ei
t U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 A
t 0
4:
46
 1
5 
A
ug
us
t 2
01
7 
(P
T)
Diamantopoulos, A. (2006), “The error term in formative measurement models: interpretation and
modeling implications”, Journal of Modelling inManagement, Vol. 1 No. 1, pp. 7-17.
Diamantopoulos, A., Rieﬂer, P. and Roth, K.P. (2008), “Advancing formative measurement models”,
Journal of Business Research, Vol. 61 No. 12, pp. 1203-1218.
Diamantopoulos, A. and Siguaw, J.A. (2006), “Formative versus reﬂective indicators in organizational
measure development: a comparison and empirical illustration”, British Journal of Management,
Vol. 17 No. 4, pp. 263-282.
Diamantopoulos, A. and Winklhofer, H.M. (2001), “Index construction with formative indicators: an
alternative to scale development”, Journal of Marketing Research, Vol. 38 No. 2, pp. 269-277.
Donaldson, L. and Davis, J.H. (1991), “Stewardship theory or agency theory: CEO governance and
shareholder returns”,Australian Journal of Management, Vol. 16 No. 1, pp. 49-64.
Edwards, J.R. (2001), “Multidimensional constructs in organizational behavior research: an integrative
analytical framework”,Organizational ResearchMethods, Vol. 4 No. 2, pp. 144-192.
Eichenseher, J.W. and Shields, D. (1985), “Corporate director liability and monitoring preferences”,
Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, Vol. 4 No. 1, pp. 13-31.
Essig, M. and Batran, A. (2005), “Public–private partnership: development of long-term relationships in
public procurement in Germany”, Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management, Vol. 11 No. 56,
pp. 221-231.
Faccio, M., Lng, L.H.P. and Young, I. (2001), “Dividned and expropriatation”, American Economic
Review, Vol. 91 No. 1, pp. 54-78.
Fama, E.F. and Jensen, M.C. (1983), “Separation of ownership and control”, Journal of Law and
Economics, Vol. 26 No. 2, pp. 301-325.
Feldmann, D.A. and Schwarzkopf, D.L. (2003), “The effect of institutional ownership on board and
audit committee composition”, Review of Accounting and Finance, Vol. 2 No. 4, pp. 87-109.
Felo, A.J., Krishnamurthy, S. and S.A. and Solieri, (2003), “Audit committee characteristics and the
perceived quality of ﬁnancial reporting: an empirical analysis”, Working Paper, available at:
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=401240 (accessed 6 April 2017).
Fernández, C. and Arrondo, R. (2005), “Alternative internal controls as substitutes of the board of
directors”, Corporate Governance: An International Review, Vol. 13 No. 6, pp. 856-866.
Filatotchev, I., Kapelyushinkov, R., Dymonia, N. and Aukutsionek, S. (2001), “The effect of ownership
concentration on investment and performance in privatized ﬁrms in Russia”, Managerial and
Decision Economics, Vol. 22 No. 6, pp. 299-313.
Firth, M., Fung, P.M. and Rui, O.M. (2007), “Ownership, two-tier board structure, and the
informativeness of earnings–evidence from China”, Journal of Accounting and Public Policy,
Vol. 26 No. 4, pp. 463-496.
García-Meca, E., Sánchez, J.P and Ballesta, S. (2009), “Corporate governance and earnings
management: a meta-analysis”, Corporate Governance: An International Review, Vol. 17
No. 5, pp. 594-610.
Greco, G. (2011), “Determinants of board and audit committee meeting frequency: evidence from Italian
companies”,Managerial Auditing Journal, Vol. 6 No. 3, pp. 208-229.
Gillan, S., Hartzell, J.C. and and Starks, L.T. (2006), “Evidence on corporate governance: the joint
determination of board structures and charter provisions”, AFA 2007 Chicago Meetings Paper,
available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=891402 (accessed 4 April
2017).
Giroud, X. and Mueller, H.M. (2011), “Corporate governance, product market competition, and equity
prices”, Journal of Finance, Vol. 66 No. 2, pp. 563-600.
Guest, P.M. (2009), “The impact of board size on ﬁrm performance: evidence from the UK”, The
European Journal of Finance, Vol. 15 No. 4, pp. 385-404.
MAJ
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 B
irz
ei
t U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 A
t 0
4:
46
 1
5 
A
ug
us
t 2
01
7 
(P
T)
Habib, A. and Hossain, M. (2012), “CEO/CFO characteristics and ﬁnancial reporting quality: a review”,
Research in Accounting Regulation, Vol. 25 No. 1, pp. 88-100.
Hair, J.F., Jr, Hult, G.T.M., Ringle, C. and Sarstedt, M. (2016), A Primer on Partial Least Squares
Structural EquationModeling (PLS-SEM), Sage Publications.
Hassan, M.K. (2015), “Corporate governance, audit committee and the internet reporting of strategic
information by UAE non-ﬁnancial listed ﬁrms”, Journal of Accounting and Management
Information Systems, Vol. 14 No. 3, pp. 508-545.
Hassan, Y.M. and Hijazi, R.H. (2015), “Determinants of the voluntary formation of a company audit
committee: evidence from Palestine”,Asian Academy of Management Journal of Accounting and
Finance, Vol. 11 No. 1, pp. 27-46.
Henry, D. (2004), “Corporate governance and ownership structure of target companies and the outcome
of takeovers”, Paciﬁc-Basin Finance Journal, Vol. 12 No. 4, pp. 419-444.
Hoskisson, R.E., Castleton, M.W. and Withers, M.C. (2009), “Complementarity in monitoring and
bonding: more intense monitoring leads to higher executive compensation”, Academy of
Management Perspectives, Vol. 23 No. 2, pp. 57-74.
Hussainey, K. and Aljifri, K. (2012), “Corporate governance mechanisms and capital structure in UAE”,
Journal of Applied Accounting Research, Vol. 13 No. 2, pp. 145-160.
Hussainey, K. and Wang, M. (2010), “Voluntary disclosure and corporate governance: further UK
evidence”, Working paper, Stirling University.
Hutchinson, M. and Gul, F.A. (2004), “Investment opportunity set, corporate governance practices and
ﬁrm performance”, Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 10 No. 4, pp. 595-614.
Ivashkovskaya, I. and Stepanova, A. (2011), “Does strategic corporate performance depend on
corporate ﬁnancial architecture? Empirical study of European, Russian and other emerging
market’s ﬁrms”, Journal of Management & Governance, Vol. 15 No. 4, pp. 603-616.
Jarvis, C.B., MacKenzie, S.B. and Podsakoff, P.M. (2003), “A critical review of construct indicators and
measurement model misspeciﬁcation in marketing and consumer research”, Journal of
Consumer Research, Vol. 30 No. 2, pp. 199-218.
Jensen, M.C. (1993), “Themodern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control systems”,
The Journal of Finance, Vol. 48 No. 3, pp. 831-880.
Jensen, M.C. and Meckling, W.H. (1976), “Theory of the ﬁrm: managerial behavior, agency costs and
ownership structure”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 3 No. 4, pp. 350-360.
Kirk, D.J. and Siegel, A. (1996), “How directors and auditors can improve corporate governance”,
Journal of Accountancy, Vol. 181 No. 1, pp. 103-111.
Klein, A. (2002), “Audit committee, board of director characteristics, and earnings management”,
Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 33 No. 3, pp. 375-400.
Krishnan, J. (2005), “Audit committee quality and internal control: an empirical analysis”, The
Accounting Review, Vol. 80 No. 2, pp. 649-675.
Kyereboah-Coleman, A. (2007), “Corporate governance and shareholder value maximization: an African
perspective”,African Development Review, Vol. 19 No. 2, pp. 350-367.
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. (1998), “Law and ﬁnance”, Journal of
Political Economy, Vol. 106, pp. 1113-1150.
Lam, W. (2000), “The development and signiﬁcance of corporate audit committees”, The CAMagazine,
pp. 3-40.
Lin, C.P. and Chuang, C.M. (2011), “Principal-principal conﬂicts and IPO pricing in an
emerging economy”, Corporate Governance: An International Review, Vol. 19 No. 6,
pp. 585-600.
Lin, J.W., Li, J.F. and Yang, J.S. (2006), “The effect of audit committee performance on earnings quality”,
Managerial Auditing Journal, Vol. 21 No. 9, pp. 921-933.
Corporate
governance
mechanisms
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 B
irz
ei
t U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 A
t 0
4:
46
 1
5 
A
ug
us
t 2
01
7 
(P
T)
Lins, K.V. (2003), “Equity ownership and ﬁrm value in emerging markets”, Journal of Financial and and
Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 38 No. 1, pp. 159-184.
Loosemore, M., Raftery, J., Reilly, C. and Higgon, D. (2005), Risk Management in Projects, 2nd ed., Spon
Press, London.
McKnight, P.J. and Mira, S. (2003), “Corporate governance mechanism, agency costs and ﬁrm
performance in UK ﬁrms”, available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=460300
McMullen, D.A. and Raghunandan, K. (1996), “Enhancing audit committee effectiveness”, Journal of
Accountancy, Vol. 182 No. 2, pp. 79-81.
MacKenzie, S.B., Podsakoff, P.M. and Jarvis, C.B. (2005), “The problem of measurement model
misspeciﬁcation in behavioral and organizational research and some recommended solutions”,
Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol. 90 No. 4, pp. 710.
Mather, P. and Ramsay, A. (2006), “The effects of board characteristics on earnings management
around Australian CEO changes”,Accounting Research Journal, Vol. 19 No. 2, pp. 78-93.
Mitton, T. (2002), “A cross-ﬁrm analysis of the impact of corporate governance on the East Asian
ﬁnancial crisis”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 64 No. 2, pp. 215-241.
Mohid Rahmat, M., Mohd Iskandar, T. and Mohd Saleh, N. (2009), “Audit committee characteristics in
ﬁnancially distressed and non-distressed companies”, Managerial Auditing Journal, Vol. 24
No. 7, pp. 24-638.
Monks, R.G. andMinow, N.M. (2004), Corporate Governance, Blackwell Publishing.
Naser, A.A.K., Al-Mutairi, A. and Rana Nuseibeh, K. (2014), “Can substitution and signaling theories
explain the relationship between external audit fees and the effectiveness of internal corporate
governance?”,Global Journal of Management and Business Research, Vol. 13 No. 5, pp. 41-49.
Nelson, S.P. and Devi, S. (2013), “Audit committee experts and earnings quality”, Corporate
Governance, Vol. 13 No. 4, pp. 335-351.
Obay, L.A. (2009), “Corporate governance and business ethics: a Dubai-based survey”, Journal of Legal,
Ethical and Regulatory Issues, Vol. 12 No. 2, pp. 29-47.
OECD (2005), “Advancing the corporate governance agenda in the Middle East and North Africa: a
survey of legal and institutional frameworks” Working Group 5, Task Force on Corporate
Governance of Banks, Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Paris.
O’Sullivan, M., Percy, M. and Stewart, J. (2008), “Australian evidence on corporate governance
attributes and their association with forward-looking information in the annual report”, Journal
of Management and Governance, Vol. 12 No. 1, pp. 5-35.
Pearce, J.A. and Zahra, S.A. (1992), “Board composition from a strategic contingency perspective”,
Journal of Management Studies, Vol. 29 No. 4, pp. 411-438.
Peasnell, K.V., Pope, P.F. and Young, S. (2005), “Board monitoring and earnings management: do
outside directors inﬂuence abnormal accrual”, Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Vol. 32
Nos 7/8, pp. 1311-1346. Nos
Peng, M.W. (2009),Global Business, South-Western Cengage Learning, Cincinnati.
Peng, D.X. and Lai, F. (2012), “Using partial least squares in operations management research: a
practical guideline and summary of past research”, Journal of Operations Management, Vol. 30
No. 6, pp. 467-480.
Petrovic-Lazarevic, S. and Djordjevic, Z. (2002), “Inﬂuence of social protection programs on senior
management styles in the Serbian building and construction industry”, Proceedings Management
in New Environment, The Faculty of Organizational Sciences,Belgrade, pp. 571-576.
Petter, S., Straub, D. and Rai, A. (2007), “Specifying formative constructs in information systems
research”,MIS Quarterly, Vol. 31 No. 4, pp. 623-656.
Piot, C. (2004), “The existence and independence of audit committees in France”, Accounting and
Business Research, Vol. 34 No. 3, pp. 223-246.
MAJ
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 B
irz
ei
t U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 A
t 0
4:
46
 1
5 
A
ug
us
t 2
01
7 
(P
T)
Prentice, R.A. and Spence, D.P. (2007), “Sarbanes-Oxley as quake corporate governance: howwise is the
received wisdom?”, Georgetown Law Journal, Vol. 95, pp. 1843-1909.
Pucheta-Martínez, M.C. and De Fuentes, C. (2007), “The impact of audit committee characteristics
on the enhancement of the quality of ﬁnancial reporting: an empirical study in the
Spanish context”, Corporate Governance: An International Review, Vol. 15 No. 6,
pp. 1394-1412.
Raghunandan, K. and Rama, D.V. (2007), “Determinants of audit committee diligence”, Accounting
Horizons, Vol. 21 No. 3, pp. 265-279.
Raghunandan, K., Rama, D.V. and Read, W.J. (2001), “Audit committee composition, ‘gray directors,’
and interaction with internal auditing”,Accounting Horizons, Vol. 15 No. 2, pp. 105-118.
Rediker, K.J. and Seth, A. (1995), “Board of directors and substitution effects of alternative governance
mechanisms”, Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 16 No. 2, pp. 85--99.
Rogers, P., Dami, A.B.T., Ribeiro, K.C.S. and Sousa, A.F. (2008), “Corporate governance and ownership
structure in Brazil: causes and sequences”, Journal of Corporate Ownership and Control, Vol. 5
No. 2, pp. 36-54.
Saleh, N., Iskandar, T. and Rahmat, M. (2007), “Audit committee characteristics and earnings
management: evidence from Malaysia”, Asian Review of Accounting, Vol. 15 No. 2,
pp. 147-163.
Schepker, D.J. and Oh, W.Y. (2013), “Complementary or substitutive effects? Corporate
governance mechanisms and poison pill repeal”, Journal of Management, Vol. 39 No. 7,
pp. 1729-1759.
Schleifer, A. and Vishny, R. (1986), “Large shareholders and corporate control”, Journal of Political
Economy, Vol. 94 No. 3, pp. 461-488.
Silveira, A.D.M. Leal, R.P. Carvalhal Da Silva, A. and Barros, L.A.B.D.C. (2007), “Evolution and
determinants of ﬁrm-level corporate governance quality in Brazil”, available at SSRN http://ssrn.
com/abstract=995764
Shehata, N. (2015), “Development of corporate governance codes in GCC: an overview”, Corporate
Governance, Vol. 15 No. 3, pp. 315-338.
Smith, R. (2003), Audit committees: Combined Code Guidance, available at: www.ecgi.org/codes/
documents/ac_report.pdf
Stancić, P., Čupić, M. and Barjaktarović Rakocević, S. (2012), “Inﬂuence of board size and
composition on bank performance – case of Serbia”, Actual Problems of Economics, Vol. 134
No. 8, pp. 466-475.
Su, Y., Xu, D. and Phan, P.H. (2008), “Principal–principal conﬂict in the governance of the Chinese
public corporation”,Management and Organization Review, Vol. 4 No. 1, pp. 17-38.
Turley, S. and Zaman, M. (2004), “The corporate governance effects of audit committees”, Journal of
Management and Governance, Vol. 8 No. 3, pp. 305-332.
Wan Mohammad, W.M., Wasiuzzaman, S. and Nik Salleh, N.M.Z. (2016), “Board and audit committee
effectiveness, ethnic diversiﬁcation and earnings management: a study of the Malaysian
manufacturing sector”, Corporate Governance, Vol. 16 No. 4, pp. 726-746.
Ward, A.J., Brown, J.A., et al. (2009), “Governance bundles, ﬁrm performance, and the substitutability
and complementarity of governance mechanisms”, Corporate Governance: An International
Review, Vol. 17 No. 5, pp. 646-660.
Westphal, J.D. and Zajac, E.J. (1998), “The symbolic management of stockholders: corporate
governance reforms and shareholder reactions”, Administrative Science Quarterly:, Vol. 43
No. 1, pp. 127-153.
World Bank (2015), World Development Indicators, available at: http://databank.worldbank.org/data/
home.aspx (accessed 08 April 2017).
Corporate
governance
mechanisms
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 B
irz
ei
t U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 A
t 0
4:
46
 1
5 
A
ug
us
t 2
01
7 
(P
T)
Yermack, D. (1996), “Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors”, Journal of
Financial Economics, Vol. 40 No. 2, pp. 85-211.
Yiyi, S., Xu, D. and Phan, P. (2008), “Principal-principal conﬂict in the governance of the Chinese public
corporation”,Management and Organization Review, Vol. 4 No. 1, pp. 17-38.
Zaman Groff, M. and Valentincic, A. (2011), “Determinants of voluntary audit committee formation in a
two-tier board system of a post-transitional economy–the case of Slovenia”, Accounting in
Europe, Vol. 8 No. 2, pp. 235-256.
Zhang, Y., Zhou, J. and Zhou, N. (2007), “Audit committee quality, auditor independence, and internal
control weaknesses”, Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, Vol. 326 No. 3, pp. 300-327.
Corresponding author
Kamal Naser can be contacted at: profnaser@yahoo.co.uk
For instructions on how to order reprints of this article, please visit our website:
www.emeraldgrouppublishing.com/licensing/reprints.htm
Or contact us for further details: permissions@emeraldinsight.com
MAJ
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 B
irz
ei
t U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 A
t 0
4:
46
 1
5 
A
ug
us
t 2
01
7 
(P
T)
